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I.Introduction
In a legal system such as ours, in which legislative bodiescon-
fine themselves for the most part to prescribinggeneral norms of conduct
rather than highly specific rules, the published decisions ofcourts
and administrative agencies interpreting andapplying the legislative
enactments are important sources of the specific rules of law. Whenthe
parties to a legal dispute are unable to agree on the meaning of the
governing statute as applied to their dispute, litigationmay ensue in
which that meaning will be an issue for the court to resolve. The
court's resolution will define the specific requirements of thestatute
in the circumstances presented by the case and thuscreate (subject to
a qualification noted below) a specific rule of legal obligation
applicable to like circumstances.
The rules produced by the process of adjudicationare distinctive in
being implicit rather than explicit rules.' The rule promulgated bya
decision is not the court's express statement, ifany, of a rule; rather,
it is the court's holding, that is, .the minimum rule (whetheror not
expressly articulated) necessary to explain the outcome of the case. The
rule created by a single decision will therefore tend to beextremely narrow
in scope; a broader judge—made rule willgenerally require a series of2
judicial decisions--a string of holdings—-for it is only from aseries of
decisions, each determining the legal significance of a slightly different
set of facts, that a rule applicable to a situation common or general
enough to be likely to recur in the future can be inferred.
A factor pushing in the same direction is that the authority
of a rule declared in a single decision is limited unless the
rule is declared by a higher court for the guidance of a lower one in
the same jurisdiction. Especially in appellate litigation, most of the
judge-made rules urged on the court are those of a coequal court, or those
declared in the earlier decisions of the same court; such rules have
persuasive force, but are not binding. Where, however, the rule has
been, as it were, solidified in a long line of decisions, the authority
of the rule is enhanced. The rule then represents the accumulated
experience of many judges responding to the arguments and evidence of
many lawyers and is therefore more likely to be followedin subsequent
cases.
The distinctive attributes of decisional rules are captured in the
term that the legal system uses to describe such rules: "precedents."
In ordinary language, a precedent is something done in the past that
is appealed to as a reason for doing the same thing again. It is much
the same in law. The earlier decision provides a reason for deciding
a subsequent similar case the same way, and a series of related prece-
dents may crystallize a rule having much the same force as a statutory
rule. Accordingly, legal precedents are more accurately described as3
inputs into the production of judge-made rules of law thanas the rules
themselves; but this refinement will be ignored in thispaper to
simplify the exposition.
The use of precedents to create rules oflegal obligation has, to our
knowledge, received little theoretical or empirical analysis.2This paper
presents and tests empirically an economic approach tolegal precedent
that is derived mainly from the analysis ofcapital formation and investment.
We treat the body of legal precedents createdby judicial decisions in
prior periods as a capital stock that yields a flow of informationservices
which depreciates over time as new conditions arisethat were not foreseen
by the framers of the existing precedents. New (andreplacement) capital
is created by investment in the production ofprecedents.
The basic data for the empirical analysisare case citations appearing
in judicial opinions. An initial problem is thata case citation is not
the same thing as a precedent. Sometimesa case is not cited as a
precedent; an example is a citation of the decision ofa lower court (or
courts) in the same case. Our samples exclude this obviousnonprecedential
citation, and other (less obvious) ones.3 In someinstances, counting
citations may result in underestimating the true number ofprecedents
by excluding the precedent that is so effective indefining the require-
ments of the law that it prevents legal disputes fromarising in the
first place or, if they do arise, induces them to besettled without
litigation. In the limit, such a usuperprecedentht mightnever be cited
in an appellate opinion yet havegreater precedential significance than
the most frequently cited cases. But suchcases are probably rare.
If a case is highly specific, it willhardly qualify as a usuperprecedent;4
bydefinition it will control only those infrequent cases that present
virtually identical facts to those of the case in which it was originally
announced. If it is highly general, and therefore more likely to be an
important precedent, it is unlikely to decide so clearly as to prevent
disputes or litigation from arising, the specific form of the question
presented in subsequent cases.
Citationsby scientists and other scholars to scientific and scholarly
books and articles (rather than by lawyers and judges to cases) have been
studiedextensively by historians of science, by sociologists, and by
economists.4 Scholarly citations, however, are not examples of the use of
precedent. The normal function of the scholarly citation is not to
adduce authority for a proposition but to give credit for prior original
work, to refer the reader to corroborative or collateral findings by
other scholars, and as a method of incorporating by reference relevant
theorems, proofs, etc. Since the second and third functions of scholarly
citation have counterparts in judicial citation, studies of scholarly
citation may have relevance to understanding judicial citation, but the
present paper does not explore the possible parallels between scholarly
and judicial citation.
The idea of analyzing judicial citation practices for regularities
that might refute or support hypotheses derived from capital theory will
no doubt strike many lawyers, both practicing and academic, as a dubious
undertaking. Not only are many lawyers skeptical in general concerning
the use of economic models and quantitative methods to study the legal
system, but they assume that judges' citation practices are altogether
too idiosyncratic to be illuminated by general theory and statistical5
aggregation. Whether a judicial opinion cites many cases or few, old
cases or new, is, they believe, more a function of the judge'spersonal
style, tastes, erudition, pedantry, etc. than of systematic characteristics
of the legal process. Yet this seems improbable. Theextensive research
and writing that lawyers, judges, and law clerks devoteto discovering,
marshalling, enumerating, and explaining precedents are not costless
undertakings, and would not be undertaken if precedent did not enter
systematically into the decision of cases. However, the question whether
or not the use of precedents is systematic does not have to be decided
on a priorigrounds; to the extent that judicial citation practices exhibit
regularitiesexplicable within a systematic analytical framework, a
statistical analysis of precedent should reveal them.
The paper is organized as follows. Part II describesour case samples
and presents tables summarizing the princijal characteristics ofcitations.
The theoretical analysis is contained in Part III. Therewe formalize
the capital-investment model, derive hypotheses, and discuss theproduction
of precedents in the absence of an explicit market. Part IVdevelops
techniques for using case citations to study precedents empirically and
presents the results of our empirical analysis. The final part of this
paper, Part V. suggests some areas of further research utilizing the
approach developed here.6
II. The Samples
Our first and principal source of data on precedents is a random
sample of 658 decisions (an approximately one-in-ten sample) handed down
by the federal courts of appeals during an approximately 18-month period
beginning in January 1974 and ending in the sumer of 1975. Each decision
was classified by subject matter, and the number and age of citations
to both earlier Supreme Court and other-court decisions were recorded.
Two other data sources were also developed for this study: a random
sample of 223 decisions (again an approximately one—in—ten sample) by
the federal courts of appeals during 1960, and all of the decisions
handed down by the Supreme Court during its 1974 term.
Table 1 presents a subject-matter breakdown of the decisions in
our three data sets. The subject—matter classifications we employ are
gross,5 but this is unavoidable because of the limited number of cases
included in our samples. Table 1 indicates the close comparability
between the subject-matter distributions of our 1960 and 1974-1975
courts of appeals samples and those reported by the Administrative Office
of the U.S. Courts for all cases commenced in the courts of appeals in









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































To avoid becoming confused later on, the reader should be careful to
disting(ish between the cases in our three samples (hereafter "sample cases")
and our measure of precedents. The sample cases presented in Table 1 are
not the precedents that we studied; they are the source of our data on
precedents. It is the citations in the sample cases that are the precedents
(more precisely, the proxy for the precedents) used in the empirical analysis.
Thus, we study Supreme Court precedents by analyzing the citations to Supreme
Court decisions contained in both the courts of appeals and the. Supreme Court sample
cases, and courts of appeals precedents by analyzing citations
to courts of appeals decisions in both the courts of appeals and Supreme Court
sample cases. This is not the only way,to collect and analyze data on
precedents. An alternative approach, not used in this study, is to trace the
history of a case as a precedent by counting the citations to that case in
later judicial opinions.7
Table 2 summarizes the data on precedents that we obtained from the
three sets of sample cases. The average ages, standard errors,.
and numbers of citations are presented by subject-matter classes for each
data set.8 Within each subject-matter classification there is a further
breakdown between citations to U.S. Supreme Court decisions and citations
to other court decisions. The reason for distinguishing empirically among
subject matters, and between Supreme Court and other-court citations, is
that theory (developed in the next part of this paper) suggests that
precedents will differ systematically both across subject-matter classes and
between the Supreme Court and other courts, in particular the U.S. courts
of appeals.9
Two methods of calculating the age of citations are used in Table 2.9
The column labeled "unweighted" is the meanacross decisions of the average
age of the citations in each decision. The column labeled weighted" isthe
average of all of the citations in the subject-matter class (i.e., the
average age of the citations in each decision weighted by the number of
citations).1° An example willhelp to clarify the difference between the
unweighted and weighted method. In the 1974—1975 courts ofappeals sample,
492 cases cited Supreme Court precedents. For each ofthese 492 cases we
calculated the mean age of citations to Supreme Court citations.The
unweighted age (18.5 years in Table 2) is theaverage of the 492 means
(i.e., in effect each of the 492 case means isgiven a weight of one). The
weighted average (19.1 years in Table 2) weights each of the 492case means
by the number of citations contained in that case, and is thusequiv-
alent to the mean age of the 2,278 citations contained in the 492sample
cases.
[Insert Table 2]
Table 2 reveals some interesting regularities in theage of judicial
citations. Citations to Supreme Court decisionsregularly tend to be twice
as old on average as citations to other courts' decisions--roughly, 20
years old compared to 10.11 Of further interest is the similarity of the
weighted and unweighted means and of the age distributionsacross subject-
matter classes among the 1960 and 1974-1975 court of appeals samples and
the 1974 Supreme Court sample. Anotherinteresting statistic is the
"half life" (i.e., median age) of a precedent. In the 1974-1975courts of
appeals sample, half of the citations to Supreme Court and other-court
decisions were less than 9.8 and 4.3years old, respectively (compared to
weighted means of 19.1 and 9.9 years). In the 1974 Supreme Courtsample,TABLE 2












Total 19.1 18.5 4.630 9.9 8.8 9.197
(.3) (.7) (.228) (.1) (.3) (.360)


























































































































































































































































































































































































Total 25.8 22.7 15.032 15.7 12.37.689
(.3) (1.3) (1.012) (.6)(1.4) (.694)
(2345] [1561 (938] [122)
Common law 35.4 27.9 12.000 26.5 20.1 11.500
(1.2) (4.9) (2.334) (2.2) (9.8) (4.070)
[156] [13] [115] [10]
Torts and 30.2 24.0 10.364 16.8 18.27.500
contracts (1.3) (4.8) (2.413) (3.3) (11.8) (2.771)
[114] [11] [60] [8]
Admiralty 49.5 49.9 21.000 37.2 27.5 27.500
(.5) (3.3) (3.000) (2.1) (18.2)(14.500)
[42] [2] [551 [2]
Economic 22.9 23.2 11.250 13.4 10.38.625
regulation (.6) (2.1) (1.029) (.4) (1.2) (1.431)
(540) [48] [345] [40]
Tax 40.7 36.2 9.375 12.1 10.5 11.5
(2.1) (6.4) (2.42) (.3) (1.9) (3.538)
(75] [8] [69] [6]
Antitrust 18.3 22.1 12.000 20.7 13.37.000
(1.1) (5.6) (2.163) (2.6) (6.7) (2.168)
(96] [8] [35] [5]
Labor 15.8 15.6 10.412 12.9 10.5 11.867
(.6) (2.2) (1.269) (.4) (1.5) (3.038)
[177] [17] [178] [15]
Other federal 23.2 23.6 13.231 7.2 7.3 3.750
reg. agencies (.7) (3.4) (2.790) (.8) (1.8) (1.081)
[172] [13] [45] [12]
Patents 38.2 36.9 10.000 23.8 18.79.000
(.5) (2.5) (5.0) (.6) (5.7) (8.000)
[20] [2] [18] [2]
Civil rights 22.7 23.0 21.923 15.4 15.68.222
(.5) (2.8) (3.857) (1.8) (6.2) (1.786)
[285] [13] [74] [9]
Constitutional 23.7 17.0 17.531 20.5. 13.36.708
(.7) (3.0) (2.826) (2.2) (3.9)(1.256)
(561] [32] [161] [24]
Criminal (md. 23.1 20.4 13.973. 10.8 9.86.607
const.) (.6) (2.7) (1.943) (.7) (2.2) (1.095)
[517] [37] [1851 [28]
Criminal (excl. 29.4 20.9 7.500 10.9 8.6 7.167
const.) (1.8) (5.6) (2.076) (1.2) (2.9) (1.266)
[90] [12] [86] [12]
Bankruptcy 34.2 36.6 18.4 9.7 14.65.800
(.7) (5.2) (10.829) (2.0) (6.5) (1.530)
[92] [5] [29] [5]
Military 30.5 30.8 23.000 9.8 6.85.500
(.1) (.4)(12.000) (.7) (3.8) (4.500)
[46] [2] [11] [2]
Land 63.7 52.7 25.667 27.8 27.83.000
condemnation (2.7) (16.2) (12.574) (10.5) (23.5) (0.0)
[77] [3] [6] (2]13
TABLE2 CQflt.
Notes: w = weigktedaverage(see text forexplanation).
u = unweighted average (see text for explanation).
No.per case =average number of citations per case.
1.In each subject-matter class there arethreenumbers per column under
the age columns: the top one is the meanage; the middle one (in paren-
theses) is the standard error of the mean; and the lowestone (in brackets)
is either the number of citations (weightedcolumns) or number of cases
with citations (unweighted columns).
2.In the nO.-per-case column there are two numbersper column: the top
one is the mean number and the second one (in parentheses) is thestan-
dard error of the mean number.14
the half lives of Supreme Court and other court decisions were 13 and
5.4 years respectively (compared to weighted means of 25.8 and 15.7 years).
The substantial skewness in the age distribution of citations
is due in part, as.we show later, to the growth over time in
the production of precedents. But this cannot be the complete explanation,
because it does not account for the skewness in citations to the Supreme
Court, where the production of precedents has remained relatively constant
over time. Other explanatory variables are the obsolesence or depreciation
of legal precedents, the generality or specificity of precedents, statutory
activity,and other factors explored later.
The half lifeof citations in scholarly journals appears to be generally
shorter than that of citations in judicial decisions-—forexample,
5.5years in economic and in sociological articles and about four years in
physics and biomedicalresearch)2Another basis of comparison to scholarly
citationsis the number of citations per decision or article. Combining
citations to both the Supreme Court and other courts, we find that the average
number of citations per decision is 12.3 and 21 in the 1974-1975 courts of
appeals and in the Supreme Court samples, respectively. This compares to
approximately 11 citations per article in leading economic journals, 18
in chemical journals, and four or five in medical journals)3
The data in Table 2 can be used to test a popular explanation of
differences in average ages of citations: differences in the individual
citation practices of judges. Arguably, whether a judge cites many or
few cases is largely a matter of personal preference or taste for citing
cases. 'This implies that the judge with little taste for citing15
cases will tend to cite only the most recent cases—-because he lacks
information on the relevance of earlier dedsions, wants to economize on
his time, or believes that the more recent ones tend to have greater
precedential significance. By the same token, the judge with a taste for
citing many cases will cite those same recent cases plus others less recent
and hence the average age of his citations will be greater. Thus, if
taste is the principal determinant of the number of citations, there
should be a strong positive correlation between the number of
citationsper case and the average age of citations per case. We, ofcourse,
question the premise that citation practice is largelya matter of
personalpreference (and implicitly therefore not capable of being studied
scientifically). The economist expects citation practices to bebasically
uniform across judges, just as he expects different businessfirms to
pursue similar investment policies in the face of similar economic condi-
tions. If a judge cites more cases, it is not becausehis taste for
citations is different but because the case before him isdifferent--
perhaps it has more issues, or its issues are less clearly controlledby
some precedent. Accordingly, we would not expect to finda strong
positive relationship between the number of citationsper opinion and their
average age.
This issue can be illuminated by empiricalanalysis. A useful first
step is to compare the weightedto the unweightedaverage ages in Table 2,
since a positive correlation betweenaverage age and number of citations
implies tjiat the weighted method will yielda higher average age than the16
unweighted.4 For all subject-matter categories
taken together (the first row of Table 2), the weighted
exceeds the unweighted in all six possible comparisons. In our largest
sample, however, the 1974-1975 U.S. courts of appeals sample, the differences
are slight--.6 years and 1.1 years for citations to Supreme Court and
other-court decisions respectively. In the two smaller samples the
differences are somewhat greater, averaging about three years.
A more powerful test of the importance of the number of citations on
age (and thus a more powerful test of the "taste" hypothesis) is to estimate
a regression of the form
(1)
where is the average age of citations in the ith case, C. the number of
citations in the ith case, and a vector of subject-matter dummy
variables. Equations (3.1) -(3.6)in Table 3 present the results of simple
regressions of on C. for Supreme Court and other-court citations for
[Insert Table 3]
our three data sets. The regressions show that the number of citations does
have a positive effect on the age of citations, but the effect is
statistically significant in only four of the six equations, and the mag-
nitude of the effect is small. For example, in the 1974-1975 sample of
citations to the Supreme Court (I-SC) an approximate doubling in the number
of citations in a decision, from the mean of 4.6 to 10, increases
the mean age of citations by only about .6 years (from 19.1 to 19.7 years),
and an increase in the number of citations to other courts (1-OC) from the
mean of 9.2 to 20 increases the average age by only about 1.3 yearsTABLE 3
Average-Age Regressions
Equation




3.1 I-SC 492 17.945 .110
(.750)
- .00
3.2 1—OC 629 7.698 .122
(3.397)
- .02
3.3 Il-SC 156 18.326 .293
(2.905)
- .05
3.4 Il-OC 122 8.823 .450
(2.470)
- .04
3.5 Ill-SC 136 18.460 .498
(1 .418)
- .01
3.6 IlI-OC 208 9.209 .311
(4.092)
- .07
3.7 I-SC 492 29.430 .342 [8.89] .18







1. Sample: I =1974-1975Court of Appeajs
II =1974Supreme Court
III =1960Court of Appeals
SC =citationsto Supreme Court cases
OC =citationsto other-court cases
2.n =numberof observations in regression.
3. t-statistics in parentheses.
4. F-statistic on set of dumy variables is in brackets
1718
(from 9.9 to 11.2 years). Even in the other two samples, the impact of the
number of citations on the average age is small; for example, in sample
11-SC, increasing the number of citations to Supreme Court cases from the
mean of 15 to 30 would increase average age only from 25.8 to 30.2 years.15
Although these results neither justify nor compel rejection of the
4
"taste"hypothesis, they indicate it is a weak hypothesis.
Not only is the magnitude of the effect of number on age of citations small,
but the amount of variation in average age across cases that is explained by
differences in the number of citations is negligible; the adjusted R2's in
Table 3 range from 0 to .07 in equations (3.1) to (3.6).
Equations (3.7) to (3.8) add 14 dummy subject-matter variables to
the 1974-1975 courts of appeals regressions. Each variable takes the value
1 if the case involves the particular subject matter and 0 otherwise.
This allows us to answer the question whether subject matter has a
significant effect on average age if the number of citations is
held constant. (Alternatively, equations (3.7) and (3.8) test the
partial effect of numbers on age, holding subject-matter constant.) An
F-test performed on the entire set of subject-matter variables indicates
that differences in subject matter generate significant differences in the
average age ofcitations)6 This result tends to undermine the "taste"
hypothesis, for there is no reason why tastes in citing cases should vary
systematically across subject-matter areas. Moreover, the "taste' hypothesis
supplies nb rationale for separating the samples into citations to the Supreme
Court and to other courts and we suspect that if the samples were not
separated in this way the observed positive effect of numbers on age would
be even weaker than we found it to be. Although we have not estimated
regressions based on a combination of these samples, the fact that citations19
to the Supreme Court tend to be older, yet the number of citationsto the
Supreme Court tend to be fewer, than to other courts suggests that thepositive
effect of numbers on age would be even weaker if citations to theSupreme
Court and to other courts were combined in the courts ofappeals regressions.
In sum, there appear to be regularities in the citation data (e.g.,
the difference between citations to the Supreme Court and to othercourts, and
the effect of subject matter) that are not explained by assumed differencesin
the individual citation preferences of judges. Amore promising approach
is to ignore differences in tastes or preferences and instead utilizean
economic framework in which precedents are viewed asconstituting a stock of
legal capital subject to depreciation and the production of precedents is
treated as a form of investment
III. The Theoretical Framework: Legal Capital
This part of the paper develops a capital-investmentapproach for the
analysis of legal precedent. We begin by formulating a model ofoptimal
investment in the production of precedents, and thenuse this model to
generate hypotheses concerning the rate of investment, the size of the
capital stock and its rate of depreciation, and the interactionamong
these variables. Finally, we examine certain pecularities-in the
precedent-production process that result from the seeming absence of
market incentives on the part of participants in thatprocess. Because of
the novelty of our approach to legal precedent,we develop the theory in
more detail than is necessary for the empirical analysis that follows.
In particular, although the determinants of investmentand the capital
stock are discussed here, these variablesare with one exception20
treated as exogenous in the empirical analysis. There we largely focus
on measuring investment and the capital stock, and combining these measures
with data on citations to estimate and test hypotheses concerning the
depreciation of legal capital.
A. Some Definitions
Let L equal the stock of legal capital in a particular substantive
area of the law (theth area) in period t. The stock is defined as the
set of precedents that have accumulated from judicial decisions in prior
periods (t-l, t-2, etc.).17 This stock generates a flow of
services in period t that may be defined as bodies of information on the
types of behavior that will be subject to civil and criminal sanctions and
on the magnitude of these sanctions. One can write the stock of legal
capital in period t as
L =I+(l-S')L_1
(2)
where is the gross investment (assumed to be nonnegative) in legal
capital that takes place in period t-l, and51 is the depreciation rate
(assumed to be constant) of legal capital during the interval t-l to t.
For purposes of empirical estimation of legal capital, it is useful to
express equation (2) as a function of investment and depreciation rates
in all previous periods. By substituting for L_1, L2, etc. we can
rewrite equation (2) as
L ='tl+ (l-5')I2 + (15i)211+,.. , +(15i)t111 (3)21
where I is the investment in legal capital in the base period 0. Equation
(3) illustrates the fundamental proposition that an investment in any
period increases the stock of legal capital in all future periods, although
the increments in the stock diminish with time due to the successive com-
pounding of depreciation rates.
Although a precedent does not "wear out" in a physical sense, it
depreciates in an economic sense because the value of its information
content declines over time with changing circumstances.18 Changes in social
and economic conditions, in legislation, in judicial personnel, and in
other parameters of legal action reduce the value of precedents as a source
of legal doctrine. To illustrate, a decision involving a collision between
two horse-drawn wagons is bound to lose some of its precedential value
when wagons are replaced by cars and trucks, and a decision turning on the difference
between "trespass" and "trespass on the case" may lose all of its precedential
value when the comon-law forms of action are abolished by statute. In
general, passage of time reduces the flow of services of a precedent,'9 and
this reduction represents the depreciation or obsolescence of legal capital.
The monetary equivalent of the information services generated by
the stock of legal capital in the th area in period t can be written as
Vt =V(Lt;Nt) (4)
(The subscript i is now suppressed for notational convenience.) We assume
positive (i.e., the greater the stock, the greater the total value of the
information services) and diminishing returns to legal capital at each
moment in time.20
The services from a given stock will also be greater
the greater is the number of users (Nt) of this type of legal capital.22
Since most activities involving two or more persons or firms are guided,
in part, by the legal consequences of the activity, one might approximate
by the community's population, income, number of business transactions,
number of firms, etc.21 Our term "monetary equivalent" is simply a con-
venient index for measuring the value of the services (previously defined
as information on the types of behavior subject to sanctions and on the
magnitude of these sanctions) generated by legal capital.22
The source of investment in legal capital in period t-l is the set of
judicial decisions in that period that create precedents--mainly published
appellate decisions. Although most legal disputes are terminated by out-
of-court settlements, we ignore the contribution of settlements to legal
capital since it is small: settlements, even when their terms are publicly
disclosed, provide little information about the content of legal rules.
Similarly, trials that occur only because of a disagreement over facts do
not generate significant legal capital since the outcome of such a trial
does not provide information about the content of legal rules. Since any
legal issue decided on appeal--and any legal issues in cases that are not
appealed--will have been decided either initially or finally at the trial
level, trial decisions can be a source of legal capital, but the fraction
of trials thatgenerates precedents is small, so we are justified in limiting
our empirical analysis to a sample of appellate decisions.(Of course,
even at the appellate level, not all decisions contribute significantly to
legal capital; an example would be the decision of an appeal that involved
only issues of the sufficiency of evidence.)
The creation of precedents through appellate decision-making consumes
the (valuable) time of judges, attorneys, law clerks, court clerks, jurors,
D23
witnesses, and litigants, plus resources associated with the construction
and maintenance of court houses, plus other scarce resources. Ignoring
forthe moment the underlying investment production function (discussed in
subpart D), we can write investments costs in period t as
C. =Cdt) (5)
where the marginal cost of is both positive (since increases in It
require greater inputs) and nondecreasing.
B. Optimal Production of Precedents
An optimal investment policy would be one that maximized the present
value (Tr) of the difference between the value of the flow of services and
the costs of investment with respect to investment in each period, subject
to the earlier conditions that Lt -1-
=
(1_6)Lt_i,is constant and
is nonnegative.23 This yields T first-order conditions (from t0 to








where R÷ is the value (dollar equivalent) at the beginning of period 0
of the services of legal capital in periods t+j (i.e., =
wherethe per-period discount rate, r, is assumed constant); is
the value of the marginal product of the service of legal capital in t+j,
and C is the marginal costs of investment. The optimality condition in
(6) represents the usual equality of marginal returns with marginal
costs.24
It is more convenient to represent the equilibrium condition in terms
of the optimal stock of legal capital in period t+l. This is given by
V1 =C(r+S_t)
(7)
where is the percentage change in the marginal costs of investment from
period t to t+l. Equation (7), which states that in each period the
capital stock is expanded until the undiscounted value of the marginal
product in that period equals the marginal user cost of capital, has the
advantage of allowing us to convert the multi-period flow equilibrium
(equation (6)) into a single—period stock equilibrium. This is illustrated
in Figure 1, where we assume that the marginal cost of investment is constant
and equal in each period (i.e., =0),implying a single-period adjustment
to any discrepancy between actual and desired capital stock. To illustrate,
if the stock in t is below the equilibrium (or desired) stock in t+l because,
for example, a new statute is passed creating a demand for new legal
capital or destroying old legal capital, then investment in period t will
be sufficient to bring the stock up to its desired level in t+1. And
if the variables in equation (7) remain constant thereafter, future
investment will just offset depreciation and the capital stock will
remain at its stationary desired level.
[Insert Figure 1]
A fundamental implication of equation (7) and Figure 1 is that the
stock of legal capital in any period will be greater, the greater the value
of its marginal product and the lower its marginal user cost (i.e., the
lower C(r+S)). Thus in areas of the law that affect more






and hence the optimal stock larger. However, the number of users of the legal
capital (Nt in equation (4)) must be weighted by the value that users attach to the
capital. Thus, a form of legal capital that has narrow applicability and hence a few
users may still be relatively large if the users attach a high value to this capital.
Similarly, in larger communities, the per capita amount of legal capital should be
greater. This follows from the public-good aspect of legal capital.In the limiting
case, the entire capital stock is received by each member of the community. Hence a
larger community induces a shift in the demand curve in Figure 1 and a greater aggre-
gate and per capita capital stock. To take another example developed later, suppose
that legislative activity depreciates legal capital; one would then expect that in
those areas of the law where there was relatively greater statutory activity
depreciation rates of legal capital would be greater and the optimal
stock of legal capital smaller.25 The effect on gross investment, however,
is uncertain. Although a higher depreciation rate lowers the optimal stock,
it also implies faster replacement of the (smaller) stock.26 As a final example,
the stock of legal capital would tend to grow over time if, for exampleNt was
growing secularly. Thus, the demand curve in Figure 1 would be shifting
to the right (provided V1 was a positive function of Nt), leading to a
secular increase in the capital stock. And assuming a constant rate of
growth of the capital stock and a constant 6, gross investment would grow
at a rate equal to that of the capital stock.27
C. Depreciation of Legal Capital
In the previous subpart we considered the effect of different deprecia-
tion rates on investment and the capital stock. We did not, however,
explore the forces that affect the depreciation rate itself.It is useful
to extend our analysis in this direction since, as indicated earlier,
it is possible to integrate data on investment and citations for the purpose27
of estimating depreciation rates on legal precedents by subject matter--estimates
that we believe are interesting in themselves as well as necessary in order to test
hypotheses derived from the capital-theory approach to legal precedent. What follow
therefore, is both the development of some testable hypotheses on depreciation and
some further discussion of the interrelationship among depreciation, investment, and
capital. We do not, however, explicitly incorporate depreciation as a decision
variable in the formal model developed in the previous subpart and attempt to derive
optimal depreciation rates. A preliminary attempt to do so indicated that such a
modification would be exceedingly complicated and would not alter substantively the
capital-investment framework used in the empirical analysis.
1. General Versus Specific Legal Capital, Other things being equal,
a precedent can be expected to depreciate more rapidly the narrower
(more specific) it is in terms of the span of facts and issues that it
covers. Conversely, the broader (more general) a precedent is, the slower
should be its rate of depreciation. A general precedent is less likely to
be rendered obsolete by a change in the social or legal environment in
which the precedent is applied; for example, a decision laying down a broad principle
of tort liability should retain its precedential force--be cited--for a
longer period of time than one holding that railroads must station flagmen
at certain crossings. A general precedent is like a machine that, being
adaptable to a number of different uses, is less subject to technological
obsolescence than one specialized to a particular industrial task, or
like general human capital (e.g., schooling), which tends to depreciate
over the life cycle of an individual more slowly than investment in specific
capital (e.g., training specialized to a particular employer).
The distinction between general and specific legal capital implies
that Supreme Court precedents will depreciate more slowly than those of
other courts such as the federal courts of appeals. The Supreme Court28
ismore selective than any other court in its choice of cases toreview,
due in major part to its more limited capacity (which is due in turn to
society's evident reluctance to increase the number of Supreme Court Justices or take
other measures that would enable the. Supreme Court to increase its production of
precedents) compared to other courts. Thus, while the Supreme Court's output of
precedents has remained constant for many years despite the enormous
secular increase in the number of legal disputes within the Court's juris-
diction,28 the appointment of additional judges to the federal courts of
appeals has enabled those courts greatly to increase their output of
precedents.29 The more limited capacity of the Supreme Court compared to
that of the courts of appeals has made the opportunity cost of developing
new precedents and modifying old ones increase faster in the Supreme Court.
That is why the Supreme Court has had to become relatively more selective
over time in its choice of cases to review, and one might expect this
selection to favor cases of greater generality30 and hence more durability
as precedents. This implies, incidentally, that, other things being equal,
the depreciation rate of Supreme Court precedents should have declined
over time relative to that of the courts of appeals.
In relying on the greater generality of Supreme Court precedents to
predict that they will depreciate more slowly than
courof appeals precedents, we may seem to be overlooking the obvious:
Supreme Court precedents depreciate less rapidly than courts of appeals
precedents because, being more authoritative, they are more valuable.
However, neither economic nor any other theory predicts that a capital good
will depreciate more slowly because it. is more valuable:
modern weapons systems and computers are examples of expensive capital
goods that depreciate rapidly (compared, say to lathes). The value of a
good does not dictate when it is replaced.29
2. Statutory Activity and Depreciation. Precedents can be expected
to depreciate more rapidly in areas of law in which there is considerable
statutory activity, since a change in statutory law will tend to make
precedents based on earlier statutory language obsolete. If we could
reliably measure the levels of statutory activity across the various sub-
ject-matter areas in our sample, we could test this hypothesis rigorously.
At this stage, only a casual empirical analysis of the hypothesis appears
feasible. A further difficulty in testing this hypothesis arises from the
possibility that the legal system will anticipate statutory activity.
If statutory activity is anticipated in area A but not B, the courts may
adapt by making their precedents in A more general and hence more adaptable,
in which event the observed depreciation rate might not differ across
areas that differed in statutoty activity. Still another difficulty is
that legislatures may pass statutes in areas where legal capital depreciates
at a high rate precisely in order to compensate for the relative uncer-
tainty in those areas. In such a case, statutory activity and depreciation would
be positively correlated but the direction of causality would be reversed.
3. Substantive Versus Procedural Citations. We have attempted to
disaggregate our 1974-1975 courtsof appeals sample into citations to
substantive and to procedural issues by subject-matter classes. Since
identical procedural issues can arise in different substantive areas,
cases in different areas might cite many of the same cases on procedural
questions. If so, one would expect less variation in depreciation rates
of procedural precedents across subject-matter classes than of substantive
precedents. The testing of this hypothesis, however, is hampered by the
conceptual difficulty of distinguishing between "substantive" and "pro-30
cedural" citations--for example, is the issue of damages in an antitrust
case a substantive or a procedural question?
4. Uncertainty, Litigation, and the Production of Precedents. Suppose
that the stock of legal capital, and hence the flow of information on the
likely outcomes of potential legal disputes, were temporarily below the
desired (long-run equilibrium) level. This might be due to new legislation
orother unanticipated changes in economic or social conditions that
renderedpart of the existing capital stock obsolete. Withthe resulting
increasein uncertainty, more disputes would arise, parties to a dispute
would find it more difficult to forecast the outcome of litigation, and
litigation would increase. The result would be a temporary increase in
the production of precedents (investment) until the discrepancy between
31 . actualand desired capital was eliminated. (This process is described
in greater detail in the next subpart.) Alternatively, suppose depreciation
were permanently higher in one subject-matter area of the law compared
to another, with other factors held constant. Although the capital
stock (and possibly gross investment) would be smaller in the area with
higher depreciation, the ratio of investment to capital should be greater.
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Thus, a higher observed depreciation rate, whether caused by temporary
or permanent forces,should be associated with a greater investment-capital
ratio.
This hypothesis can be tested in two possible ways. From estimates of
depreciation, investment, and the capital stock by subject matter, the
relationship between depreciation and the investment-capital ratio can
readily be determined. A difficulty with this test is the limited number
of subject-matter classes in our sample. A more powerful test (not31
performed in this paper, however) would be to apply the depreciation
rates calculated in this paper to other data sets containing more observa-
tions. Specifically, we could examine the trial-settlement ratios and
appeal rates across the more than 90 U.S. district courts as a function of
the depreciation rates in each subject-matter class weighted by the proportion
of cases in the district in each class and other variables such as the length
of trial queues. Since higher depreciation is a measure of relative
uncertainty, we should observe that, other things being equal, the higher
is the weighted depreciation rate of a district, the greater will be the
proportion of trials in the district.
D. The Production Function of Legal Precedents
The actual production of legal precedents combines two basic
inputs:(1) the resource inputs of the parties to legal disputes in
litigating their disputes in the courts and (2) the inputs of judges
in writing judicial opinions that will operate as precedents in future
cases. A mysterious aspect of the production process is the apparent
absence of market incentives. Consider first the production of precedents
from the point of view of the disputants. The individual or firm that
brings a case that becomes an important precedent-—a Hadley v. Baxendale
or a Marbury v. Madison--receives no "royalty" or other compensation from
use of the case to decide subsequent cases. To be sure, some litigants
(e.g., railroads defending tort suits or the government prosecuting antitrust
violations) anticipate the recurrence, in future litigation to which they
will be parties, of the issues involved in the current litigation, and such32
litigants have an interest in the precedent produced by the litigation.
But most litigants do not anticipate a recurrence of the same or even of
similar issues in future litigation to which they will be parties, and from
their standpoint the precedent produced by the current litigation is a
worthless by-product of dispute resolution. This raises the question
how the demand for precedents shown in Figure 1, a good that accrues
primarily to the community as a whole rather than to individuals or firms
in the community, can be translated into a private demand which will induce
the private production of precedents.
The answer lies in an understanding of why litigation, as
distinct from out-of-court settlement, ever occurs, given that
normally it is costlier than settlement. Economic analysis suggests
that, in general, litigation will occur only when the parties are
unable to agree on the likely outcome of the litigation, and more
particularly when one party (or both) significantly exaggerates the
probability that it will prevail.33 Thus the ratio of lawsuits to settle-
ments is mainly a function of the amount of uncertainty, which leads
to divergent estimates by the parties of the probable outcome of litigation.
The amount of legal uncertainty34 is, in turn, a function of the stock
of legal rules, a stock in most areas of the law composed largely of
precedents.
The ultimate dependence of the litigation rate on the stock of legal
knowledge assures that at least one of the critical inputs into production
of precedents--the litigants' research and advocacy--will respond in a
manner at least roughly congruent with the social need for them. Absence33
or depletion of the relevant legal capital incites litigation, which
produces precedents as a by-product and thereby builds up the stock.
Suppose, for example, thata completely new statute has just been enacted.
There are no precedents indicating how the statute is to be applied toa
variety of specific disputes (we can assume that like most statutes this
one is ambiguously or at least generally worded). Initially, therefore,
there will be great uncertainty as to the practical meaning of the statute.
The uncertainty will increase the private costs of negotiating out-of-
court settlements of disputes resulting from attempts to apply the statute,
because the outcomes of litigation over the meaning of the statute will be
difficult to predict. Hence a good deal of litigation can be expected to
occur and, as a by-product, precedents defining the precise, meaning of the
statute will be generated. As the stock of legal knowledge relating to the
statute is built up, uncertainty will fall, and with it the amount of
litigation and hence the production of additional precedents. But uncer-
tainty will not be eliminated; as changing social or economic conditions
generate new kinds of disputes over the application of the statute
the stock of prior legal knowledge will depreciate, inducing litigation
that will produce fresh precedents.
This analysis suggests how it has been possible for the Anglo-American
legal system to rely, for almost a thousand years, on the uncompensated
efforts of litigants to create most of the legal rules administered by the
legal system. There are, to be sure, alternative methods of inducing the
production of precedents. One is government subsidy--and since the end34
of the fee system of defraying judicial expenses, litigation has been (modestly)
subsidized by having the expense of judicial personnel, court facilities,
etc. defrayed by the taxpayer rather than by the litigants. Another
possibility would be to give the litigants property rights in the precedents
generated in any lawsuit to which they were parties. Just as a composer
receives a royalty every time a song he has written is played on a radio
station, so-—in principle anyway-—a litigant could be given a royalty every
time that a case he had brought (or defended35) was cited in the brief or
oral argument of a subsequent case.
Before appraising these alternatives, we must consider the incentives
of the judges, the other critical input into the production of legal
precedents, to participate in that production. The independence of the
judiciary (especially of the federal judiciary, the focus of our attention
in this paper) from the political branches of the government36 makes it
extremely difficult to model judicial behavior in economic terms; the
outcome of a case seems unrelated to the judge's welfare. One approach
is to posit that the independent judge derives welfare by imposing his
policy preferences on the community. This approach,which is broadly
consistent with the ordinary assumptions of self-interested behavior
employed in economic analysis, is helpful in explaining why a judge might
want to create precedents rather than just resolve disputes: to the
extent it is followed in subsequent decisions,the precedent will affect more
behavior. Indeed, dispute resolution as such affects no behavior; it
merely redistributes the losses created by some past incident, and those
are sunk costs.
Less obviously perhaps, this approach may also explain why judges35
follow precedents. It is the practice of deciding in accordance with
precedent that makes decisions operate as precedents. No matter how wilful
a judge is, he is likely to follow precedent .to some extent, for if he did
not the practice of decision according to precedent ("stare decisis," the
lawyers call it) would be undermined and the precedential significance of his own
decisions thereby reduced. To be sure, there is a potentially serious free-rider
problem. The judge who disregards all precedents but his own may gain more
utility in increased freedom to impose his personal preferences on the
community than he loses by contributing to a general erosion of the principle
of adherence to precedent. But the free-rider problem is held in check by
the structure of appellate review. Usually there is one court, with relatively
few members, who are supreme within any given jurisdiction. Their power
to reverse the decisions of lower courts checks any tendencies on the part
of lower-court judges to disregard precedent, and their own position in
the judicial hierarchy checks their own tendencies in that direction. If
the U.S. Supreme Court refuses to accord precedential weight to earlier
Supreme Court decisions, it thereby undermines the precedential weight
of its own decisions. To be sure, the trade-off is a complicated one,
and we would not expect--nor do we find--that the balance is always in
favor of adherence to precedent. Our argument, however, is not that
precedent is always adhered to, but that decision according to
precedent will often represent rational self-interested behavior to judges
who personally disagree with the precedent in question.
If there is a judicial demand for legal advocacy that will assist
courts in adhering to old and formulating new precedents, the litigants will
supply such assistance even though their only interest is in resolving a36
dispute. However, although this point might seem to implythat the provision
of subsidy or ASCAP-type royalties may not be necessary to preventunder-
production of precedents, it ignores the availability ofsubstitute modes
of dispute resolution-—such as private arbitration—-that do not involve
the production of precedents and hence are less costly to the disputants.
To avoid inefficient substitution away from the courts, a public subsidy
of ourt litigation may be justified after all. (An alternative wouldbe to tax
private arbitration.) And since the identificationof a case that will be
an important precedent may be difficult or impossible tomake in advance, a general
subsidy of litigation may be more efficient than an attempt tosubsidize
just those litigants who in fact contribute to the productionof precedents.
The question whether judges indeed follow the principle of staredecisis or
decision according to precedent can be approached empirically by askingwhat a re-
fusal to decide cases according to precedent would imply with regardto the citation
practices of judges. (A preliminary question might be,if judges do not follow precedent
why do they cite cases at all? The answer might be, tofool people into thinking they
were following precedent. But we distrust explanationsthat assume persistent
gullibility on the part of the community.) Such a practicewould imply
that the observed depreciation rate of precedents was zero: the judgewho
is indifferent to the precedential significance of the cases willtend to
pick cases to cite from past years roughly in proportionto the amount of
gross investment, implying (as we showin the next section) zero depreciation.37
A more plausible rival to the hypothesis that judges
decide in accordance with precedent, giving due weight to depreciation,is
that judges, in some courts and some periods, disregard the
precedents established by their predecessors; they tryto change the law to37
make it conform to their own views of public policy. This practice, some-
times called "judicial activism" and frequently associated with the "Warren
Court" of the l960s, does not imply an indifference to precedent as such, and
hence does not imply a zero depreciation rate. Rather, it implies a desire
on the part of the judges to replace the precedents of an earlier period
with new, contrary precedents. Precisely what the citation practice of an
activist court would be is unclear. The court might cite few cases; or it
might reach back into the distant past for prececents, in which event the
observed depreciation rate of the precedents cited by it might'be low.
Presumably, as the activist court produced more and more of its own
precedents (i.e., by deciding cases), the measured depreciation rate of
precedents cited by it would rise, for it would tend to cite its own
precedents, which would be recent, and not to cite (many) precedents of
earlier judges. What seems unambiguous, however, is the impact of judicial
activism on the depreciation rate indeed of precedents in the decisions of a
lower court. If the Warren Court was indeed an unusually activist one, then the
depreciation rates of Supreme Court precedents should be lower in our sample of
1960 court of appeals cases (prior to the heyday of the Warren
Court) than in our 1974-1975 court of appeals sample. The courts of
appeals are bound by the precedents created by the Supreme Court and if the
Warren Court destroyed much existing legal capital, replacing it with its
own (necessarily recent) precedents, this would show up in an increase in the
depreciation rate of Supreme Court precedents in the courts of appeals.38
IV. EmpiricalAnalysis
A. Specification of the Model
There are two basic techniques for using the age distribution of
citations to estimate rates of depreciation or obsolesence of legal capital.
The first makes exclusive use of the mean of theage distribution.In its
crudest form, the rate of depreciation is inferred solely from the reciprocal
of the averag age of citations; thus, the older theaverage age, the lower
the depreciation rate. This procedure has a counterpart in the citation
analyses of sociologists of science, where the age of citations to scholarly
works is used to develop measures of the relative "hardness of different
scientific disciplines, the rate at which scientific knowledge diffuses,
its rate of obsolesence, and other phenomena., The second technique we employ,
a far more efficient one (as we show below), makes use of the entire
frequency distribution of citations to earlier decisions, not just the mean.
Using regression analysis, we are able to estimate depreciation rates and
extend the empirical analysis to the determination of the forces affecting
investment, depreciation, and capital, and the interrelationship among these
variables.
1. Average Age of Citations. The reader will recall our earlier derivation
of the stock of legal capital in equation (3). By utilizing the assumption of a
constant nonnegative rate of growth of legal capital, equal to 0, which
implies an identical constant rate of growth of gross investment,38 we can




where y =01(1+0)and the number of periods is sufficiently large so that
0. The proportion of precedents in this stock that are
exactly one year old (It_i/Lt) equals (ól-y-5y); the proportion of two-year-
old precedents (1t2/Lt) equals (&f-'-6y)(l-S)(l-y); and, more generally, the
proportion of precedents that are A year old is given by
f(A) =(&4'—&y')[(l)(l—y)]i (9)
Now assume that we have a random sample of type i cases to be decided
in period t and the stock of precedents relevant to these cases is given
by equation (8). Since each proportion f(A) can be interpreted as the
probability of selecting a precedent that is A years old, the mathematical




E(A) = , (11)
assuming again that t is sufficiently large.
This result can be made clearer by an example. If today's capital stock
contained some precedents that were one year old, some two years old, etc.,
and these precedents had been produced over time at a constant (nonnegative)
growth rate of 0 and had in turn depreciated at a constant rate of 6, then
the mean age of precedents (citations) would be given by equation (11).
Therefore, if one were able to estimate the growth rate and the average
age, equation (11) could be used to calculate the depreciation rate. For
example, a 10-year mean age and a growth rate of five per cent per year would40
yield in the limit a 5.5 per cent depreciation rate. Finally, if either
the depreciation rate or the growth rate were zero, equation (11) would
simplify to l/y or 1/iS respectively.
There are two drawbacks to this procedure for estimatingdepreciation
rates. First, the assumption of a constant growth rate of investment--a
convenient mathematical simplification--depends on the assumption that the
legal system is on a long-run equilibrium growth path. For certain sub-
stantive areas of the law, the evidence strongly contradicts thisassumption.
Civil rights is the most obvious example. We have estimated that the
production of precedents in the U.S. courts of appeals in the civil-rights
area has been growing at an annual rate of 15.6 per cent since 1953 (the
first year that civil rights cases were separately classified by
the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts). This ismore than three
times the average rate of precedent production in the courts of appeals.39
Similarly, the civil-rights growth rate has been 7.3 per cent in the U.S.
Supreme Court since 1948, compared to an overall (i.e., all our subject-
matter classes taken together) growth rate of 1.2per cent.
Changing social and economic conditions and their interaction with legisla-
tion over the last 25 years have induced a rapid increase in the demand
for civil-rights precedents, but it would be highly questionable toassume
that this is the long-run equilibrium growth in the demand for civil-
rights precedents. Probably the growth in civil'rights
precedents prior to the 1950's was closer to the overall
growth rate of precedents in the courts of appeals and Supreme Court.4°
A second drawback of this procedure is the absence of a measure of
the standard error of the calculated depreciation rates. Althoughone can
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test the significance of differences in average ages of citations across
subject-matter classes and between the Supreme Court and the courts of
appeals, there is no readily available technique for testing the significance
of differences in the depreciation rates themselves.
2. The Age Distribution of Citations. Let denote the number of
precedents produced t years ago (t =0,1, 2, ..., 1)that have survived
to the current period 0, and C the number of citations in
period 0 to judicial decisions t years ago. Assume that citations and
precedents are related as follows:
P =kCexp(ut) (12)
where k is a proportionality factor between citations and precedents4' and
u. is a random error term (for example, due to sampling errors in data
collection). The proportionality condition--the key assumption that
allows one to use citations to study precedents--states that if, for example, we
observe twice as many citations to decisions of X than 2X years ago, then twice
as many precedents have survived into the present from the former than from
the latter period. This example is also helpful in illustrating the
implicit weighting scheme built into our empirical analysis. In recording
the number of citations, our case readers made no distinction between
two citations to a single case from t years ago and the citation of two
such cases; in both instances the number of citations to t-years-old
decisions would be two.42 Thus, it is possible (though unlikely) that one
would observe twice as many citations to decisions of X than to those of
2X years ago, yet the number of decisions actually cited in the two
periods would b identical. Even so, one would not want to assign equal42
precedential significance to the surviving precedentsfrom the two different
time periods,and our method of counting citations weights decisions
more heavily the more often they are cited. In our hypothetical
example twice as many equivalent decisions (i.e.,decisions of equivalent
precedential significance) would have survived fromX than from 2X years old
decisions even though an equal number of cases from both periods werestill being
cited.43 More generally, estimates of depreciation in our study are based on decisions
of equal precedential significance where significanceis assumed to be
proportional to citations.
Let I equal the annual investment in precedent productionthat




where I equals our estimate of I based on a countof written opinions
t years ago, m is a proportionality factor applicableto investment, and
Vtisa random error term. The number of precedentsthat have survived from
t years ago to period 0 equals investment in thatearlier period discounted
by the depreciationrate,44 as in
=Iexp(-ôt) . (14)
By making the appropriate substitutions, takinglogs, and rearranging terms,




whereis a constant (equal to ln(m/k)), equals -6,and is a disturbance
term assumed to be subject to first-order serialcorrelation (i.e.,43
= + ewhere p equals the serial correlation coefficient). Since
we have data on both the age distribution of citations and the annual number
of written opinions, a simple regression (with an adjustment for serial
correlation) of the log of the citation-investment ratio on time will yield
an estimate of the depreciation rate.45
The regression method of estimating depreciation has several important advan-
tages compared to that of the mean age. First, it enables a measure of the
statistical significance of S; this facilitates the testing of hypotheses. Second,
there is no need to assume a steady—state equilibrium in which the capital stock
and investment are growing at a constant rate. Third, equation (15) is
the foundation of a more completeestimation system for the determinants
of depreciation and investment. A possible specification of this system
in addition to equation (15) would include
= + + Ct (16)
It = + 2'5t+3't+ (17)
where X. is a vector of variables determining the depreciation rate in
period t (possibly, turnover in judicial personnel and new legislation);
Vt is a vector of variables affecting the level of gross investment
(possibly, changes in population, national income, legislation and the
stock of legal capital); and is an average of depreciation rates prior to
t (since depreciation is expected to influence investment). We mention
this more complete equation system, which is not estimated here but will44
be utilized in subsequent work on a more comprehensive sample, because
it shows clearly the interesting extensions that are possible when one
integrates citation data into a regression framework.
B. Depreciation-Rate and Capital-Stock Estimates
1. The Problem of Measuring Investment. Before presenting our estimates
of depreciation and of the capital stock of precedents we discuss briefly
how we measured investment. It might appear straightforward to measure
the annual investment in the production of precedents--all one needs to know
is the number of cases decided each year in the relevant court and subject-
matter category. In fact, there are serious estimation problems.46
The first is the problem of what to count as a precedent-—all
terminations, only contested terminations, all terminations in which an
opinion is written, or only signed majority opinions (as distinct from per
curiam and memorandum opinions)? Since only a decision in which an opinion
is issued is likely to be cited in a subsequent decision, it is clearly
appropriate to limit the pool of precedents to such decisions. Unfortunately,
data on the number of written opinions are not published for the courts of
appeals, but must be tabulated by counting the opinions contained in the
more than 800 volumes of the Federal Reporter.
Second, the available statistical data on subject matter are inadequate,
and increasingly so the further back in time one goes. Subject-matter
data are available for the Supreme Court back to 1930 but for the courts of45
appeals only since 1947 and only for cases commenced and
not for cases terminated or for written opinions. Ifwe assume that the
distribution by subject matter of cases commenced in the courts ofappeals
is proportional to that of written opinions in thosecourts, then the
distribution of written opinions by subject-matter can be computedby
multiplying the relevant proportion by our estimate of the total number
of written opinions. But to obtain estimates of investmentby subject
matter in both the courts of appeals and the Supreme Court foryears in which
such data are not available, a more arbitrary assumption must be made:
that the distribution of opinions by subject matter in thoseyears is equal
to that of the earliest years for which such data are available. However,
this assumption is not likely to create serious errors inour regressions
estimates of depreciation even though those estimates are generally
based on a 100-year period: since our citation data have beenaggregated
for the early years, the number of observations foryears prior to 1948 or
1930 is far fewer than the number of years between 1847 and 1930or
1948.
A further problem with our estimation procedure is thedifficulty of
matching citation and investment data by subject-matter classes. For
example, our estimate of annual investment in civil-rights precedents is
restricted to opinions in civil-rights cases, yet some citations ina
sample civil-rights case may not be to prior civil—rights decisions
but to decisions in other fields of law.Although
this error is likely to understate actual investment withina subject-matter46
area, we have no reason to believe that it is systematically related to
time. Hence the error would enter the residual term in equation (15),
reducing the estimated R2. The error is also likely to be relatively
more important (and the R2 lower), the more narrowly the subject-matter
class is defined. This is generally consistent with our findings in the
empirical analysis.
2. Depreciation-Rate Estimates. Tables 4 and 5 present regression
estimates derived from equation (15) of the depreciation rates by subject-
matter classes of the precedents cited in our 1974-1975 courts of appeals
(Table 4) and Supreme Court (Table 5) samples. Both ordinary—least-
squares (OLS) and Cochrane—Orcutt generalized-least-squares (GLS) estimates
are presented-—the GLS method to deal with the assumed first-order serial
correlation of the disturbance term. The estimated depreciation rates are
nearly always positive, generally within a range of two to seven per cent per year, ID
andmost are statistically significant.49 Several of our estimates, however,
are based on a small number of cases, and though statistically significant
are nevertheless unreliable.50
[Insert Tables 4 and 5]
In our earlier discussion of the production function of precedents, we
hypothesized that a court that gave no weight whatever to precedential
significance in deciding a case and writing the opinion would act as if its
choice of citations depended solely on the relative number of past opinions, and
the citations by such a court would tend, therefore, to have a zero depreciation
rate. Tables 4 and 5 enable us to reject this hypothesis and the theory of judicial
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































the rudimentary theory of judicial decision-making sketched in that discus-
sion, that judges not constrained by the threat of reversal of their deci-
sions by a higher court would tend to depart more frequently from deciding
according to precedent than courts that were so constrained, and that this
would show up in a lower depreciation rate of their citations (because they
would be giving less weight to the recency of the precedents cited). Some
evidence for this hypothesis is provided by a comparison between the
depreciation rates in Tables 4 and 5. The depreciation rates of cases cited
by the Supreme Court are almost uniformly lower than those of cases cited by
the courts of appeals. Of the tenpossible comparisons from the GLS regressions
(holding court and subject matter constant), nine depreciation rates are lower
in the Supreme Court sample (Table 5) than the courts ofappeals sample (Table
4). This suggests that the Supreme Court pays less attention to recency
(authority) in its citations than the courts of appeals--as we would expect
since Supreme Court decisions cannot be reversed by a higher court.
3. Capital-Stock Estimates. Table 6 presents estimates of the stock of
legal capital for precedents produced in the Supreme Court and in the courts
of appeals (see equation (3)). Two estimates are given for each court. One is the
capital stock of precedents produced in the period 1949 to 1973; the
other is the stock produced in the longer period from 1874 (1894 for the
courts of appeals) to 1973.The second estimate is the more comprehensive
but is subject to substantially greater error because of the difficulty,
noted earlier, of classifying very old cases by subject
matter.
[Insert Table 6]

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































somewhat unclear. Since cases differ in their precedential significance,
a pure count of cases or even one adjusted for depreciation does not reveal
whether the capital stock of precedents is really larger in one subject-
matter area than in another, or larger in the Supreme Court than in the
courts of appeals. A more illuminating statistic, also shown in Table 6,
is the ratio of the capital stock to accumulated investment (unadjusted
fordepreciation). This ratio tells us the proportion of precedents
producedover a given period that have survived to 1974. For example,
the ratio .63 for court of appeals common law precedents indicates that
63 per cent of these precedents produced in the period 1949-1973 have
survived into 1974. This ratio can be meaningfully compared both across
subject-matter classes and between courts. (For example, 67 per cent of
comon law precedents produced in the Supreme Court have survived into
1974 compared to 63 per cent for the courts of appeals.) Usually (but not
always) a high depreciation rate will be associated with a low rate of
survival of precedents.51 To take an extreme example, a 33 per cent deprecia-
tion rate of civil rights precedents produced in the courts of appeals
yieldsa 28 per cent survivalrate of precedents produced between 1949
and 1973. As one might expect from the generally lower depreciation
rates in the Supreme Court, the precedents produced in that court between
1949 and 1973 usually have a higher survival rate than those produced in
the courts of appeals.52 The differences in survival rates, however, are
generally of relatively smaller magnitude than the differences in deprecia-
tion rates because of the more rapid growth in investment in recent
years in the courts of appeals than in the Supreme Court.53
C.Tests of Other Hypotheses
In this section, we present results of empirical tests ofthe remaining
hypotheses developed earlier. These hypotheses concern(1) generality
versus specificity of precedents, (2) effectof statutory activity, (3)
procedural versus substantive precedents, (4) effectsof uncertainty, and
(5) Warren Court activism.
1.General Versus Specific Legal Capital. We hypothesized that
Supreme Court precedents were more general thanthoseof other courts
(particularly the federal courts of appeals), and hencewould depreciate
more slowly. The results for the 1974-1975 courtsof appeals sample in
Table 4 are consistent with this hypothesis. The depreciation
rate of Supreme Court citations is lower than that of othercourts in 13 of
the 16 possible comparisons using the GLS method. The major
exception is federal taxation. The two other
exceptions are the patent and bankruptcy classes, where weestimate negative
depreciation rates from the GLS regressions (though a95 per cent confidence
interval includes positive depreciation rates for both classes)and
positive rates from the OLS regressions. Incidentally,these are the only
two negative depreciation estimates in our entire set of regressions.
The results from our sample of Supreme Court decisions are similar,
but less marked--indeed, for all classes together, the SupremeCourt and
other-court depreciation rates are the same, using the GLSmethod. The
explanation for the difference in this regard betweenthe Supreme Court
and court of appeals samples may be that, in general, decisionsof other
courts do not have substantial precedential significance inthe Supreme54
Court and the Court may therefore be less concerned with their recency,
which is an important attribute of a citation viewed as a
precedent. This is consistent with our earlier attempt to explain the lower
depreciation rates generally in the Supreme Court sample.
The hypothesis that Supreme Court precedents tend to be more general
compared to other-court precedents can be tested indirectly by examining
the number of citations per case to Supreme Court and other-court decisions.
If Supreme Court precedents are indeed more general (implying that they
cover more issues), then in a aiven opinion there should be fewer citations
to Supreme Court than other-court decisions. The results for the court
of appeals sample presented in Table 7 are consistent with this hypothesis;
the average number of Supreme Court citations is about half that of other-
court citations in the broad subject-matter classes. Of further interest
is the dramatic reversal of these ratios in the Supreme Court sample, which
supports our earlier point that decisions of other courts may have little
precedential significance in the Supreme Court. There is an interesting
difference between the common law area and the other subject-matter areas
in the Supreme Court sample: in the common law area the ratio of Supreme
Court to other-court citations is 1.04 compared to a ratio of about two
in the other subject-matter areas. The explanation may lie in the
Erie decision, which gives other-court (especially state-court) decisions




2. Statutory Activity. We hypothesized that the depreciation rates









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Tables 4 and 5 provide modest support for this hypothesis. As expected, we find
a lower-than-average depreciation rate in the cornon law area, one of
limited statutory change, and a higher-than-average depreciation rate in the
economic-regulation and civil-rights fields, both areas of substantial
statutory activity. However, there are a number of anomalies, such as the
very low depreciation rate of Supreme Court civil-rights precedents in the
court of appeals sample (in contrast to a more than 30 per cent annual
depreciation rate of other-court precedents), and the much higher depreciation
rates of other-court precedents in antitrust (an area of relatively little
statutory change over time) compared to tax (an area of great statutory
change over time). The antitrust estimates, however, are probably not
reliable because they are based on a small sample of cases. Thus, it is not
surprising that the difference between antitrust and tax depreciation rates is
reversed for Supreme Court precedents.
There are two very serious problems in measuring the effect of statutory
activity on the rate at which precedents obsolesce. The first is the
difficulty of measurino statutory activity; simply counting the number of. statutory
enactments and amendments in an area is no measure of the relevant variable.
The second problem is that measuring the effect of statutory activity
on the depreciation rate requires that other facts be held constant, notably the
depreciation caused by changes in judicial doctrine—-an important
factor in the antitrust area. Much more work must be done before the
statutory-activity hypothesis can be considered either rejected
or confirmed.
3. Procedural Versus Substantive Precedents. The theory suggests57
that the procedural precedents cited in cases within a particular
subject-matter class should depreciate more slowly than the substantive
precedents so cited. This is because the procedural precedent is more
general or versatile--it could be used in another subject-matter area
(e.g., a case deciding a point of pleading in an admiralty case could
be used to decide a similarpoint arising in a tax case). A major problem
in testing this hypothesis is our complete lack of data on invest—
ment in producing procedural precedents. We can, however, test a weaker
version of this hypothesis by comparing average ages. One should observe
less variation in average ages across subject-matter classes for
procedural than substantive citations because the former (at least in part)
come from a comon pool of precedents. The results of this comparison
are presented in Table 8.
[Insert Table 8]
Table 8 provides little support for the hypothesis. There is no
significant difference between the standard deviations of substantive and
procedural mean ages across subject-matter classes.54 Moreover, a regression
analysis indicates that the age of substantive citations is a highly
significant predictor of the age of procedural citations across subject-
matter classes,55 whereas the "common pool" hypothesis would suggest that ages of
substantive citations would not be a significant predictor of ages of procedural
citations. There are reasons for doubting these tests, rather than the hypothesis.
First, our case readers reported difficulty in classifying cases as
procedural versus substantive--a difficulty any lawyer will understand.
Second, our impression is that most of the procedural precedents used
in a particular substantive subject-matter area are precedents involving58
TABLE 8
Mean Ages of Substantive and Procedural Citations,
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1. Mean ages are based on weighted method (seepp. _____supra).
2.In each subject-matter class there are two numbersper column:
one is the mean age and the bottom one is the number of citations.
the top59
that area--that most procedural precedents are in practice, though not in
principle, pretty much limited in use to the substantive area in which they
arose. This is partly an aspect of the first point (many apparently pro-
cedural questions are in fact influenced by the substantive context) and
partly, perhaps, an aspect of lawyers' research habits (they are more apt
to be familiar with the procedural decisions rendered in cases arising in
the substantive areas in which they are expert). No doubt there is a class
of "pure" procedural cases that are of great generality or versatility, but
they may be too few to influence our statistical results measurably. That
of course, is our rationale for combining substantive and procedural
decisions in presenting the depreciation rates reported in Tables 4 and 5.
4. Depreciation and Investment. We hypothesized that the higher the
depreciation rate of precedents, the more difficult it would be to forecast
the outcomes of legal disputes, and the greater the rate of investment in
precedent production. One method of testing this hypothesis is to examine
the effect of differences in depreciation rates on the rate of investment
across subject-matter classes. Our estimating equation is of the form
ln I/L
= + + u1 (18)
where I is the average annual investment in 1972 and 1973 in the ith
subject-matter class, L is the capital stock at the end of 1971 in
each class,56 51 is the estimated depreciation rate from the GLS regressions
on the 1974-1975 court of appeals sample in Table 4,57 andu' is the
disturbance term. Since there are ten subject-matter classes in the courts
of appeals and 11 in the Supreme Court (the "constitutional' class forming
an additional class) there is a maximum of 21 observations in the regression
analysis.60
The results presented in Table 9 are consistent with thehypothesis
that an increase in depreciation leads to a positive adjustment in the
rate of precedent production. The regression coefficients on the
depreciation rates, which are positive and highly significant, indicate that
a ten per cent increase in depreciation is associated with approximately
a seven per cent increase in the rate of precedent production.58 Theelasticity
estimate for the Supreme Court is unaffected by an expansion
of the number of periods used to measure the capital stock (compare the
first and third equations), and there is no significant difference between
the Supreme Court and courts of appeals in either the responsiveness of
investment to a change in depreciation (i.e., the difference between the
regression coefficients ° CA and 6SC in the first equation is not signifi-
cant) or the investment-capital ratio itself (i.e., the coefficient on the
dummy court variable is not significant).
[Insert Table 9]
There are, however, several potential problems with theanalysis.
First, there could be spurious positive correlation betweenIt/Lt and
5. Since the depreciation rate is used to compute the capital stock, an
increase in depreciation would lower the capital stock, giving rise toa
positive regression coefficient in equation (18). As it turns out,
spurious correlation is not a serious problem since the correlation between
the depreciation rate and the capital stock for the 21 subject-matter
classes is positive (.06) and not significant.59 Other possible difficulties
arise from the limited number of observations in the regression analysis
and our failure to include other variables thatmay affect the demand and





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































identifying variables that are specific to subject-matter classes).60 Thus,
our results should be viewed as preliminary evidence in support of the
hypothesis that greater uncertainty about the outcome of legal disputes
generates an increase in the rate of litigation and the production of precedents.
5. Judicial Activism and the Warren Court. Table 10 presents OLS
and GLS depreciation rate estimates for the 1960 court of appeals sample.61
To facilitate comparison with the 1974-1975 court of appeals sample, we
have reproduced the relevant depreciation rates from that sample in columns
(3) and (4) of Table 10. Although the sampling rates in the two court of
appeals samples were both 10 per cent, the 1960 sample is considerably smaller
(223 decisions compared to 653 in the 1974-1975 sample) because of the growth
in annual precedent production between 1960 and 1975, and the fact that the
1974-1975 sample is based on approximately 1.5 years of opinions. As a
result,fewer subject—matter areas are included in Table 10 because in many
areas the 1960 samplelacked a sufficient number of cases to permit
reliable estimates of depreciation. Another difference between the two
samples is the virtual absence in 1960 of civil rights and constitutional
(both criminal and noncriminal) decisions and the corresponding (relative)
reduction in the number of common law and economic regulation cases
between 1960 and 1974-1975.
[Insert Table 10]
Before assessing the "judicial activism" hypothesis, two further points about the
1960 sample are worth mentioning. The first is that in each of the subject-matter
classes in the 1960 sample Supreme Court precedents depreciate at a lower rate
than other-court precedents. This finding is consistent with our detailed





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































will depreciate at a slower rate than more specific ones. The secondpoint
is the increase from 1960 to 1975 in the proportion of sample cases
that cite Supreme Court decisions (see Table 11). For example, in the
"all" class there is a statistically significant increase in the proportion
of opinions citing Supreme Court (.610 in 1960 compared to .748 in 1974-
1975) while the proportion citing other courts remained approximately
unchanged (.933 in 1960 and .956 in 1974—1975). The three broad subject-
matter classes--common law, economic regulation, and criminal-—reveal a
similar increase over time in the proportion of decisions citing the
Supreme Court.62 These figures are superficially surprising. Assuming
that the relative availability of Supreme Court to other-court precedents,
which is determined in part by the relative number of decisions in these
courts, influences citation behavior, then with the more rapid growth of
precedent production in other courts relative to the Supreme Court since
1960 one might expect to observe a decline over time in the proportion
of cases citing Supreme Court relative to those citing other-court
precedents. The fact that the opposite effect is observed may reflect
a growing authority or generality of Supreme Court precedents since 1960,
which would increase the likelihood of their being cited.63 This inter-
pretation is consistent with our earlier point that the more limited
capacity of the Supreme Court compared to the courts of appeals should
lead the Supreme Court to become relatively more selective over time in































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































One test of judicial activism is a comparison of the depreciation rates
of precedents before and after the period of supposed activism. Since
judicial activism in the 1960s would imply an acceleration in the rate of
replacement of the precedents created prior to the 1960s, we should observe
a higher depreciation rate in the 1974—1975 court of appeals sample than in
the 1960 sample if the Warren Court was indeed an unusually activist one.
But the results in Table 10 provide only weak support for this hypothesis.
There appears to be a slight tendency for depreciation rates of Supreme Court
precedents to be higher in 1974—1975 than in 1960 (except in the tax area) but
the differences are not significant. With respect to other-court precedents,
the differences between the 1974-1975 and 1960 depreciation rates are more
mixed and even smaller.
These results must be viewed as inconclusive. Our subject-matter classes
may be too gross to detect changes in depreciation due to the Warren Court
(e.g., we were not able to make comparisons within the civil-rights area).
Moreover, by 1974-1975 the reaction to the Warren Court associated with the
emergence of a distinctive "Burger Court" may already have resulted in the resurrection
of a number of precedents ignored by the Warren Court. In future work we
hope to deal with these problems by expanding the number of cases in our
samples and by including years between 1960 and 1974-1975.
V. Conclusion and Suggestions for Future Research
The concept of precedent is at the heart of the way in which lawyers
think about the legal system. And the results of the present study suggest
that an approach which treats legal precedents as a form of investment
subject to the usual economic laws governing the formation and depreciation67
of capital may improve ourunderstanding of precedent. But
the present study is only preliminary.Future studies
will utilize much larger samples that willenable us both to utilize
more information about each case and tostudy additional facets of legal
capital. Eventually, we hope tocompare the depreciation rates of judicial
decisions with those of administrative—agencydecisions, statutes, and
constitutional provisions, tocompare different courts, to examine citation
practices in appellate briefs, and to examine thedepreciation question
from the "case history" as wellas the "citation practice" standpoint.64
Of particular interest, we believe, wouldbe a study of secular
changes in depreciation rates. There isa widely held belief in the
academic legal community that adherence toprecedent has declined over
time, particularly j the U.S. SupremeCourt, partly perhaps as a result (or
cause?) of the "legal realist" movement. Thetrend in depreciation rates
may cast light on this question, as may a comparison oftrends in different
courts.
There are many other interesting areas ofresearch on legal precedent,
a few of which we shall mention briefly in
closing:
1. The services produced by precedents,primarily in creating specific
rules of legal obligation and therebyreducing the demand for litigation
across subject-matter categories and over time,may, as suggested
earlier, be important in explaining changesover time (or across states
or federal judicial districts) in the volume of litigation.65
2. The measurement of precedentialsignificance by counting citations
may prove to hold the key to the problem ofevaluating judicial output.
For obvious reasons, the number ofterminations, trials, or even judicial68
opinions does not measure the output of a judicial system in a socially -D
interestingsense; the number of precedents--weighted by the significance
of each precedent as measured by the number of times it is cited in
subsequent decisions--may. A precedent-based measure of judicial output
could be compared with the input measures used by the Administrative Office
of the U.S. Courts in its "weighted caseload" studies, which measure the
amount of judicial time allocable to various substantive and procedural
classifications of judicial activity.66 Precedential significance as
a measure of judicial output might also be used to compare the importance
of different courts as sources of law, and even to evaluate individual
judges.
3. The number of law clerks has risen sharply in relation to the
number of judges in recent years, but we know of no systematic efforts to
appraise the significance of this development. One hypothesis about law
clerks which could be tested using citation data would be that since law
clerks (especially in the federal courts of appeals and Supreme Court) tend
to be drawn from a relatively small number of "elite" law schools,which
employ highly uniform teaching methods and materials, judicial citation
practices would tend to become more uniform, with respect to age and number
of precedents, over time as law clerks played an increasingly large role
in judicial research and opinion writings and, further, that judicial citation
practices would tend to be more uniform in the federal than in the state
court system.
-
4.A comparison of citation practices in appellate briefs and judicial
decisions may illuminate some of the fundamental characteristics of legal
advocacy. Are there systematic differences between lawyer and judge citation69
practices? Are there systematic differences between the citation
practices of the winning and losing lawyer? The answers to thesequestions
may suggest the contours of an economic theory of legal advocacy.
5. The analysis of precedent may prove helpful inexplaining observed
characteristics of the legal profession. Current researchby Peter
Pashigian indicates that lawyers' earnings increase withage relative to
those of other professionals. The explanation for thisphenomenon may lie
in the relatively low depreciation rates of legalprecedent (see Tables
4-5). They imply that an important component of lawyers'capital--their
knowledge of the substantive rules of law--obsolesces slowly, more
slowly, we assume, than the essential knowledge of physicians, engineers,
and other professionals. Therefore, when the lawyer reaches thepoint in
his life cycle where additional investments in human capital wouldnot be
economical, due to the shortness of the period in which they would yield
income, nonetheless his income may persist at a high level since hisexisting
stock of capital will decline slowly. It would be consistent with this
analysis to find that older judges cite on average older cases-—but that
study, too, we leave to the future.Landes-Poser—— Footnotes
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1.See generally Edward H. Levi, The Nature of Legal Reasoning 1-2
(1949); 1 Henry M. Hart & Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic
Problems in the Making and Application of Law 138-39 (tent. ed. 1958).
2. However, legal precedent is discussed as a form of social capital having
public—good characteristics in James M. Buchanan, The Limits of Liberty
(1974), especially in ch. 6, and some aspects of the economic theory of
precedent are also discussed in Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner,
An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. Leg. Studies 257
(1974), and in Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal
Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J. Leg. Studies 399, 448-51
(1973). Professors Lawrence Friedman of Stanford Law School and
Stanton Wheeler of Yale Law School, and their associates, are in the
process of collecting a large sample of state appellate opinions which
they plan to use for an empirical study of precedents, though not
within an economic framework.
3. The research assistants who counted the citations in the opinions in
our samples were instructedto exclude citations to lower-court
decisions in the same case, abut see" and other citations indicating
rejection of the cited case as a precedent, and multiple citations
to the same case if cited on the same point.3
4. See, e.g., Robert K. Merton, The Sociology of Science: Theoretical
and Empirical Investigations 508-09, 514-15, 556 (1973), and references
therein; Michael C. Lovell, The Production of Economic Literature:
An Interpretation, 11 J. Econ. Lit. 27 (1973), and references therein;
George J. Stigler & Claire Friedland, The Citation Practices of
Doctorates in Economics, 83 J. Pol. Econ. 477 (1975).
5. Thus, the legal purist will be distressed at our placing admiralty
cases in a category called "common law"; our purpose in doing so was
to group together cases in which statutes have played a relatively
small role as a source of legal rules. More refined classifications
are used in our current research, not reported in this paper, which is
based on a sample of about 7,000 federal court of appeals decisions.
6. A comparison of terminations involving a written judicial opinion (our
samples) to commencements is at best a crude one. Unfortunately,
the subject-matter breakdown for terminations, and subsets of termi-
nations such as terminations with a judicial opinion, are not
reported by or available from the Administrative Office. Observe that
the frequencies in our subject-matter classes tend to exceed the
frequencies in the Administrative Office data because of the larger
proportion of unclassifiable cases in the Administrative Office
data compared to our samples (e.g., 23.1 per cent compared to 2.9
per cent in 1974, and 14.9 per cent compared to .4 per cent in 1960).4
7.In a separate (and not completed) study we have classifiedsome 400
Supreme Court decisions rendered in the Court's 1900, 1938, and 1958
terms by subject matter, and then analyzed the survival rates of
precedents by tracing the time path of the citations to each decision
by the Supreme Court and by other courts.
8. Only citations appearing in majority opinions are included in Table
2; citations appearing in concurring and dissenting opinions were
also counted but are not utilized in the present study. A case cited
more than once in an opinion was counted separately every time it
was cited on a different issue; but, as previously noted, a case
cited repeatedly for the same point was counted only once.
9. However, a deficiency in our procedure (which will beremedied in
subsequent studies) is the failure to distinguish within the category
of other-court (i.e., other than U.S. Supreme Court) citations be-
tween citations to U.S. court of appeals decisions and to other
decisions (decisions of federal district courts, state courts, the
Court of Claims, English courts, etc.). Still, our category of
"other court" citations is a serviceable, if crude,proxy for U.S.
court of appeals citations, because most other-court citations are,
in fact, to U.S. court of appeals decisions, Thus, in a random
sample of 261 citations appearing in volumes of the Federal Reporter,
Second, for 1974 and 1975 (the source and period from which our 1974-
1975 U.S. court of appeals sample was drawn), 74.7per cent of the
citations (excluding citations to the Supreme Court) were to U.S. court
of appeals decisions.5
However, the mean age of the courts of appealscitations was only
5.8 years, compared to 14.5 years for the citations toother courts'
decisions and 8.0 for both groups together (weighted).(This is somewhat
lower than the mean age of other-court citationsin our main 1974-1975
sample; see Table 2.) One reason why the mean ageof the U.S. courts of
appeals citations is lower than that of theother non-U.S. Supreme Court
citations appears to be that the courts of appeals are of comparatively
recent creation (1891). The oldest citation to a court of appeals
decision in our 261-citation sample discussed in the preceding
paragraph is 50 years old, compared to 194 years forthe oldest
citation to another court's decision.[f all citations in the
sample of more than 50 years are reduced to 50 years,the mean age
of the non-courtsof appeals citations in the sample fallsfrom 14.5
to 10.5 years.
10. We also computed the ages of citations in a subsamplelimited to
cases that cite both U.S. Supreme Court and other-courtdecisions,
on the theory that cases citing only Supreme Courtdecisions might
differ systematically from those citing only other courts'decisions
and thus might distort a comparison of the mean ages of thecitations
in the respective types of decision. However, a comparisonof the
results of the subsample with Table 2 indicated that this refine-
ment in the sampling method did not produce any marked changein
results, so we did not utilize this subsample in our empirical
analysis.6
11. We have not systematically tested the statistical significance
of the differences in average age of citations across subject-
matter classes, between citations to Supreme Court and other-court
cases, etc. The standard errors are quite low, however, suggesting
that most differences in means that we are interested in comparing
are significant.
12. See Michael C. Lovell, supra note 5,at 27.
13.See ibid.
14.Let C. =numberof citations per case,=averagenumber of citations
per case, =averageage of citations per case, A =unweighted
n
average age of citations ( =ZA1/n where n =thenumber of cases),
— i=l n n
and A =weightedaverage age of citations ( =ECA./ E C. where
n — i=l'i=l















15.Observe that this implies that the first 15 citations in a case will
have an average age of 25.8 years, and the next 15 an
average age of 34.5 years in order to bring the average up to 30.2.7
16. The F-tests were 8.89 with 14 and 476 degress of freedom for
citations to the Supreme Court, and 14.98 with 14 and 613 degrees
of freedom for citations to other courts. Both were significant
at the .01 level.
17. To simplify exposition, we disregard the contributions to legal
capital that are made by statutes, constitutional provisions, and
administrative rulings and regulations.
18. This leaves open the question whether a 10 per cent depreciation
rate, for example, implies that 10 per cent of last period's prece-
dents "disappear" while 90 per cent survive in full, or whether the
services yielded by each precedent decline on average by 10 per cent.
This paper adopts the latter formulation because it encompasses
both precedents that "disappear" (100 per cent decline) and those
that decline partially in value.8
19. There areexceptions—-a long-dormant precedent may
acquire a new value because of a suddenupsurge in demand, as in
the recent controversies over impeachment andexecutive privilege.
The counterpart in the realm of physical capital is theabandoned
machine restored to service because of a sudden increase indemand
for its services.
20. Conceivably, an increase in the stockbeyond some level might produce
conflicting precedents, or so increase the difficulty of discriminating
among nonconflicting ones as to reduce the amount of information about
the expected outcome of legal disputes; either result wouldimply
a negative value of the marginal product of legal capital. Butwe
prefer to view these situations as reductions in the set of precedents
(i.e., negative investment) and hence in the capitalstock, and thus
rule out negative marginal products. Observe that theexplicit
replacement of an old by a new precedent (e.g., when old decisions
are overruled) is analytically distinguishable from aconflict between
precedents, because the overruling can be viewed, sequentially, as
the depreciation of the old precedent followed by investment in de-
veloping a new one.
21.The public-good aspect of legal capital is implicit in theformulation
of equation (4). Since one person's use of precedents does not
exclude another's use,Vt will rise as the number of users increases
(i.e., V/aN >0).If congestion eventually occurs as the number of9
users increases, then beyond some point 2VtIN <0.In the develop-
ment of our model we take as given the number of users.
22. Althoughlegal capital yields information, its value ultimately
depends onthe underlying behavior it promotes. If "value" is
synonymous with "efficiency," then the more effectively legal precedents
promote behavior consistent with efficient resource allocation,
the greater will be their value. Precedents in fact differ
greatly in the degree to which they affect efficiency, and some may actually
reduce efficiency and hence should be assigned a negative value if
value and efficiency are to be equated. But in this paper we ignore
ultimate questions of value and assume that precedents are
valuable insofar as they promote compliance with whatever legal norms
the precedents are intended to implement.
23.Nonnegative gross investment results from the inability of the
community to sell its legal capital. Although zero gross investment
in a period is possible, we assume for mathematical convenience
that the optimality conditions yield positive gross investment in
every period.
24.Equation (7) is derived by substituting (l_5)3iT/aI+1 (=0)into
(6) and assuming that C5 0. A similar expression for health
capital is developed by Michael Grossman in his Demand forHealth
(1974), and Kenneth Arrow develops the general formula using con-
tinuous time in his paper Optimal Capital Policy with Irreversible10
Investment, in Value, Capital and Growth, Papers in Honour of Sir
John Hicks (J.N. Wolfe ed. 19 ).
25.This effect would be strengthened if legal capital and legislation
were substitutable,in the sense that on balance the value of the
marginal product of legal capital was reduced by legislation. If
they were complementary, however, legislation,though increasing the
depreciation rate (and raising the cost of investment),would have
an offsetting effect by increasing the demand for capital.
26.To demonstrate this, we assume a stationary capital stock (i.e., zero
net investment). Since gross investment in period t equals SLt we
have
alnl lnL
t_1+ t — lnS




where e =_(1/V)(Vt/Lt)(the elasticity of the demand curve) and11
s =ô/(r+S)(the share of depreciation in user cost). It follows
that investment is more likely to increase with an increase in 5
the smaller are e and s. This result would have to be modified
if the capital stock were growing.
27. Gross investment may be written
It =L.(+)
where the rate of growth of the capital stock is Lt =(Lt÷i
-Lt)
/Lt
(aL/at)/L. This approximation allows us to ignorethe one-
period lag between investment and additions to the capital stock. Thus
3lnLtaln(L+6) ___=
at at
and a1n(L ÷s)/at equals zero by assumption.
28. See Gerhard Casper & Richard A. Posner, A Study of the Supreme
Court's Caseload, 3 J. Leg. Studies 339, 340-41 (1974) (tab. 1 and
fig. 1).
29. The capacity of the federal appellate courts has not,however, grown
at the same rate as. the demand.The result has been not only an12
increase in court queues but also a decrease in theproportion of
cases decided that are likely to produce precedents. Thus, while all
cases tendered to the courts of appeals are (eventually) decided--
the jurisdiction of these courts, unlike that of theSupreme Court,
not being discretionary--an increasing numberare being decided
without creating a precedent, i.e., without a writtenopinion. See
pp. _____,infra(App. A).
30. As urged by many of the Court's critics. See, e.g., Henry M. Hart,
Jr., The Supreme Court 1958 Term: Foreword: The Time Chart of the
Justices, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 84, 96—100 (1959).
31. The model developed in subpart B made the simplifying assumption
of constant marginal costs of investment (see Figure 1). Thus, any
discrepancy between the desired and actual capital stock would be
eliminated in a single period (or instantaneously in a continuous-
time model) by adjustments in investment. But if instead marginal
cost is rising within a given period (and this is likely to be so, if
only because the number of actual disputes capable of producing
precedents is limited in each period), then discrepancies between
actual and desired capital will tend to be eliminated gradually over
several periods.
32. We showed in note 26 supra that the effect of a higher depreciation
rate on gross investment was uncertain. However, since It/Lt =13
for a stationary capital stock, a higher depreciation rate must be
associated with a higher investment-capital ratio.If the capital
stock were growing, then It/Lt = +(see supra note 27).Here
a higher depreciation would also be associated with a higher investment-
capital ratio, provided there was not an offsetting decline in the
growth rate (La)ofthe capital stock.
33. See John P. Gould, The Economics of Legal Conflicts, 2 J. Leg. Studies
279, 285, 288-90 (l973); William M. Landes, An Economic Analysis of
the Courts, in Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment 164,
172-73 (Gary S. Becker & William M. Landes eds. 1974); Richard A.
Posner, supra note 2, at 418-20, 422-26.
34. We ignore, as irrelevant to the production of precedents, uncertainty purely
over issues of fact, as distinct from legal issues, though factual un-
certainty may also lead to litigation.
35.Presumably, defendants would be entitled to a share in the royalties
only when the issue for which the case was cited had been raised by
the defendant (rather than the plaintiff) in the original case by way
of defense to the charge.
36. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary
in an Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J. Law & Econ. 875 (1975).14
37. The same implication--a zero depreciation rate--could be derived from
a seemingly opposite theory of judicial behavior: that judges are so
blindly wedded to precedent that they don't realize that a precedent
ever depreciates. But perhaps this is the same theory, in that it
implies a rejection of (rational) adherence to precedent.
38. See note 27 supra.
39. See the discussion and tables on investment in Appendix A, infra.
40. One can respond crudely to the question of a nonconstant growth rateby
deriving an expression for the mean age of citations in which age is
expressed as a function of a single depreciation rate but two growth
rates: a growth rate from the base period to period j and a growth
rate from j to the current period, t. Given data onaverage and on
the two growth rates (e.g., the civil-rights growth rates before and
after 1953), one can estimate the depreciate rate by an iterative
procedure.
41. No substantive meaning can be attached to k, since it is a positive
function of sample size; i.e., the more cases in the sample, the more
citations there will be and hence the greater k will be.
42. However, we count only once multiple citations to an earlier decision
if that decision is being cited for the same point in the same case.
See note 3 supra.15
.3.Uot only is our method preferable to one that assignsequal weight to all
prior cited decision, but it greatly reduces the costsof data collection.
Much more detailed information on citationsmust be kept in order to
record citations in different sample cases tothe same decision.
44.For convenience we use a continuous time specificationin the empirical
analysis.
45.Michael Lovell (see note 5 supra) employs asimilar though less
efficient regression technique to estimate thedepreciation rate of
economic knowledge. He estimates a regressionof citations on time
and then computes depreciation by subtracting anestimate of the growth
rate of articles from the regression coefficient.
46. Because it would burden the test unduly torecount our efforts in trying
to deal with these problems, here we merelysummarize the main problems
and our solution to them. See Appendix B for a moredetailed discussion
of these problems as well as tables on investment.16
47. Our age distributions record the number of citations for each year
from 1948 through 1973-1974 (a total of 25 observations); theaverage
number of citations per year over five-year intervals from 1924-1948
(i.e., a total of five observations); and the average numberper year
over 10-year intervals from 1874-1923 (i.e., a total of five observa-
tions). Thus, only six of 35 observations in the regression analyses of
citation data to the Supreme Court and eight of 33 observations in the
other-courts regression are for years in which investment data
by subject matter are not directly available. There are only
33 observations in regressions of citation data to other courts
because the U.S. courts of appeals were not established
until 1891.
48. Complete regression results appear in Appendix A, infra.
The biethods used in estimating depreciation
rates in Tables 4 and 5 correspond to the unweighted method of estimating
the age of citations. See pp._____,supra.Procedural and
substantive citations were merged for purposes of making these
estimates.
49.In Table 4, 5 is positive in 64 of 66 equations, statistically
significant (.05 level) in 55, marginally significant (.10 level)
in 5, and not significant in the remaining 6.In Table 5, 6 is
positive in all 22 equations, significant in 18, and marginally
significant in 2 more. Of course, not all of these equations are17
independent (e.g., the OLS and GLS equations, and the equations that
aggregate several subject-matter classes into a larger class).
The difference between the OLS and GLS estimates are for the
most part negligible.
50. Although the number of observations is typically 35 in regressions to
Supreme Court precedents and 33 in regressions to other-court
precedents, the number of sample cases that are the basis for the
data need only be equal to or greater than one, for it is
possible to estimate a regression on in (C°II) using the citations
contained in a single sample case. We of course do not expect the citationsin
a single case to yield a reliable estimate of 5, and in general the more sample
cases in a subject-matter class the more reliable should be our
estimate. In the Supreme Court sample, the number of cases in the
detailed classes was often too small for us to make reliable
estimates (e.g., in citations to other-court cases there are only
2 admiralty, 6 tax, 5 antitrust, 2 patents, 5 bankruptcy
and 2 land cases; see Table 2 for the number of cases in other
categories). Even in the 1974-1975 court of appeals sample, the small
numbers of cases in antitrust (12 citing other-court cases and 10
citing the Supreme Court), bankruptcy (17 and 8) and land (8and 8)
suggest that the estimates of 6 for these classes shouldbe viewed
cautiously. Notice also that theR2's tend to be lower in
these subject-matter classes; presumably, this is due to a greater
amount of error in measuring the dependent variable.18
The reason why, in Tables 4 and 5, the number ofobservations in
the regression analysis was sometimes less thaneither 35 or 33 (e.g.,
22 in antitrust and civil rights in Table 4) isthat in some years
there were neither citations nor investment. Forexample, in the
civil-rights area, there were no citations to cases andno (measured)
investment before 1952. We excluded from theanalysis any year when
both citations and investment werezero, but if there were positive
citations but zero investment, or positive investment butzero citations, then
the year was included.En the former case we arbitrarily assumed that
investment equaled 1, and in the latter case that thenumber of
citations equaled .01.
51.If high depreciation is offset by a rapid growth ininvestment,
then the survival rate of precedents produced overa given period
might be independent of the depreciation rate.
52. Higher survival rates for Supreme Court precedents occur in most
subject-matter classes but not in the "alP category.
53. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkims, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), held that
in cases brought in federal courts only19
because of the diversity of citizenship of the parties, the courts
had to apply substantive state law, including decisional law. Since
mostof the common law cases in our sample are diversity cases, the
principally relevant precedents are state-law decisions, which are
part of the "other court" category. We plan a more refined analysis
of precedent in federal diversity cases in subsequent studies.
54. The standard deviations across the 12 subject-matter classes are
11.6 and 13.1 years respectively for substantive and procedural
citations to Supreme Court precedents, and 5.2 and 6.1 years
respectively for substantive and procedural citations to other courts.
55. The regression estimates are as follows
Supreme Court Precedents: 1.93 +.89X1
R2 =60
(4.15)
Other-CourtPrecedents: = .36 + .89X R2 =53
(3.62)
where =meanage of procedural citations in ith subject-matter
class, and X.mean age of substantive citations in ith class.
The number in parentheses is the t-statistic. There are 12
observations in each regression.
56. In order to include the court of appeals civil rights and antitrust
classes in the regression analysis (investment data for these two20
classes are available only since 1952) we estimatedL from annual
investments over the—20 year period 1952—1971. When theSupreme
Court is analyzed separately, L can be computedover a 43-year
period, 1929—1971, since investment data for each class are available
for this longer period.
57.There are two exceptions. 01$ estimates were used for thepatent and
bankruptcy precedents produced in the court of appeals because the
GLS method generated negative depreciation rates.
58. Each observation in Table 9 wasweighted by where C is the number of
sample cases used to estimate 61 in Table 4. Weighted regressions
were estimated because the error in the estimated depreciation rates
is likely to be a positive function of the number of samplecases.
(See pp. _____,supra.)Unweighted regressions, however, were also
estimated,with little change in the results.
59. For the Supreme Court, theunweighted correlations between 6and
Lt are .09 and .04 (depending on whether Lt is computed from annual
investment since 1952 or 1929), and for the courts ofappeals the
unweighted correlation is -.32.None of these correlation coefficients
is significant.
60.An alternative and promising approach would be to examine investment
over time within a subject-matter area. The advantage is that one can21
identify variables (e.g., the volume of business transactions,
population changes, key legislation, judicial turnover,subsidies to
litigants) that are likely to affect the demand and supply of precedent
production. This approach would require one to estimate a depreciation
rate that varied over time within a given subject-matter area.(For
further discussion see pp. _____,supra.)
61.In most instances GLS estimates are unnecessary because first-order
serial correlation is not present. Two exceptions are the alland
laborclasses in the citations to other courts. In one other regres-
sion--economic regulation in the citations to other courts--the Durbin-
Watson test was inconclusive.
I)
62.The only significant increase, however, is in the criminal subject-
matter class. Observe also that there were slight but statistically
insignificant increases in the proportion of cases citing other
court decisions. In one class (tax) there was a greater increase
from 1960 to 1974-1975 in the proportion of cases citingother courts than
in the proportion citing the Supreme Court.22
63. This conclusion is of course a preliminary one. We have only
examined two years and thus do not know whether the observed change
reflects a persistent trend,as our explanation implies.
64. See pp._____supra.
65. Indeed, we first became interested in the possibility of studying
legal precedents quantitatively as part of an ongoing study of the
federal courts since 1874. That study is described briefly in Richard A.
Posner, The Economic Approach to Law, 53 Texas L. Rev. 757, 769 (1975).
66. See, e.g., Federal Judicial Center, The 1969—1970 Federal District
Court Time Study (June 1971).